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This paper deals with dynamic price competition in markets in which the perception of
consumers regarding the value of goods depends on the choices of other consumers in the market.
In particular, we consider the case in which consumers tend to imitate their peers, generating a
conformity eﬀect.
In the context of a ﬁnite horizon model, we show that conformity based behavior creates new
channels of dynamic interaction between ﬁrms, changing the nature of price competition. As
time evolves, both price strategic complementarity and substitutability may arise along the equi-
librium trajectory. This leads to V-shaped equilibrium price paths and oscillating trajectories
of market shares. We provide also a new rational for the inversion of fashion trends.
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11 Introduction
The emergence of trends, fads and fashion is a very common phenomenon. Often, agents view some
of these trends as a path to social interaction and adopt them as means of social recognition by their
peers. Agents who are not willing to stand out imitate their peers in their consumption choices,
generating conformity based behavior.1 There is a wide range of goods for which this behavior can
arise, for example: alcoholic drinks, beverages, entertainment goods, garments, cars, restaurants,
clubs, touristic destinations, etc. In general, these are goods whose value has two components: the
intrinsic value of the good and its social value. For example, the intrinsic utility of being a costumer
of a certain restaurant is related to the meals served in that restaurant, whereas its social utility is
related to the social status attributed to the people who frequent that particular place.
Conformity based behavior has implications on ﬁrms’ strategies both in a static environment, as
studied by Grilo et al. (2001) and in a dynamic framework, as the one we study here. We consider
the dynamic competition of two ﬁrms that interact on prices during three periods. Each ﬁrm
produces a diﬀerentiated variant of the good and there exist conformity eﬀects in consumption. We
assume that agents take one period of time to observe the consumption trend and to conform with
it.2 Accordingly, the number of past consumers is one of the main determinants of consumption
patterns. In addition, we assume that the conformity eﬀect is non-cumulative in time, in the sense
that the current value of a good only depends on the number of consumers using a variant in the
preceding period. In a context of fast shifting trends, consumers will have no interest in imitating
the choices made by their peers in a distant past.
The hypothesis of non-cumulative and delayed conformity behavior is particularly suitable for
some types of goods, as it is the case of fashion goods (garments, restaurants, dancing clubs,
touristic destinations). On the one hand, the conformity eﬀect in the consumption of these goods
tends to be delayed as a consequence of some learning or word-of-mouth process (very often there
is a time lag to get information on the most recent fashion tendency).3 On the other hand, the
conformity eﬀect in the consumption of fashion goods tends to be non-cumulative since the number
of consumers who was using the good far-oﬀ in the past can hardly inﬂuence its current value.
In this paper, we study to which extent the existence of conformity behavior in consumption
creates new (dynamic) channels of interaction between ﬁrms, aﬀecting the nature of price com-
petition. From the point of view of ﬁrms, the conformity based behavior of consumers generates
inter-dependent demands across periods: the higher the ﬁrm’s demand in the preceding period, the
higher the social value provided by its good. This amounts to saying that, in each period, ﬁrms’
demands depend on the size of the base of users created in the preceding period. Hence, by low-
ering their prices, ﬁrms enhance both present and future consumption. In this context, we expect
1To better understand this type of behavior see, for example, Veblen (1922), Bikhchandani et al. (1992), Bernheim
(1994), Corneo and Jeanne (1997, 1999) and Grilo et al. (2001).
2Bikhchandani et al (1992) also refer to delayed conformity eﬀects, considering the case of informational cascades
in which "it is optimal for an individual, having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of
the preceeding individual without regard to his own information".
3See for example Corneo and Jeanne (1999).
2conformity based behavior to stimulate tougher competition between ﬁrms in the ﬁrst periods of
interaction.
However, this paper reveals that there are conditions in which this initial competition boost
does not arise in equilibrium. Our analysis unveils interesting results in what concerns the behavior
of the duopolists. First, we observe that, for the levels of conformity considered in this paper, both
ﬁrms adopt V-shaped equilibrium price trajectories: prices decrease from period one to period two,
increasing afterwards.
The fact that ﬁrms increase their prices as the game moves towards the end is not surprising. In
the last period of interaction, ﬁrms relax price competition in order to proﬁt from the higher social
value of their goods. On the contrary, initial price reductions are not so intuitive. One could be led
to think that, in the beginning of the game, ﬁrms have maximal incentives to adopt price-cutting
strategies. However, this result does not hold in this paper due to the ﬁerceness of competition in
the intermediary period. Indeed, we observe that, in this period, both ﬁrms quote negative prices,
privileging a strategy of enlarging the base of consumers for the last period. The higher the ﬁrms’
demands in the intermediary period, the higher the cost of the former strategy because ﬁrms would
charge a negative price on a larger number of consumers. As a consequence, ﬁrms refrain from
adopting aggressive demand-enhancing strategies in the ﬁrst period.
We also analyse the evolution of the goods’ social value along the equilibrium path. For the
level of conformity eﬀects addressed in this paper, the ﬁrm holding the good that initially yields
a higher social value ends up reverting its position. In other words, the good à la mode becomes
the unfashionable good! The reasons for this fashion reversion are twofold. First, the initially
fashionable ﬁrm has some slack and it is able to increase the price of the good à la mode, maintaining
a high level of sales. Second, for the reasons explained above, in the intermediary period, this ﬁrm
has incentives to refrain from adopting demand-enhancing strategies, even if this makes its good
less fashionable.
The previous results are related the speciﬁc nature of dynamic price competition in the presence
of conformity based behavior. In each period of time, we have investigated the existence of strategic
complementarity or substitutability on prices. The actions of two or more players are called strategic
complements if they mutually reinforce one another, i.e. if an increase in the action of one player
increases the marginal payoﬀ of the other player, leading him to also increase his strategy. Likewise,
they are called strategic substitutes if they mutually oﬀset one another. In other words, in the case
of strategic complements the reaction functions of the ﬁrms are increasing in the rival’s strategy,
whereas in the case of strategic substitutes, they are decreasing. These terms were originally
coined by Bulow et al. (1985).4 Our results can be summarized as follows. When the conformity
eﬀect is relatively less important than diﬀerentiation between products, ﬁrms’ prices are strategic
substitutes in period one and two. Only in the last period of interaction, there is a switch to
strategic complementarity. For higher intensity of the conformity eﬀect there is a change in the
4Topkis (1979), Vives (1990) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990) have developed further the study of games with
strategic complements and substitutes. See Vives (2005) for a survey.
3nature of strategic interaction: prices are strategic complements in periods one and three, and
strategic substitutes in the second period. These results follow from the dynamic nature of our
model together with the delayed non-cumulative conformity eﬀect that is being analyzed here. In
a static setting (as well as in the last period of interaction), the only incentives that ﬁrms have to
compete for consumers stem from the instantaneous proﬁts that they get. This necessarily leads to
price strategic complementarity. However, in a dynamic duopoly with non-cumulative conformity
eﬀects, the inter-temporal dependence of demands creates additional incentives to compete for
consumers. When quoting their prices, ﬁrms will take into account that their attractiveness in the
forthcoming periods depends on goods’ social value, which, in turn depends on the size of the user
base of the preceding period.
This paper belongs to the literature on conformity based behavior and conspicuous consumption
(Veblen (1922), Bikhchandani et al. (1992), Bernheim (1994), Corneo and Jeanne (1997, 1999) and
Grilo et al. (2001)). As we deal with price competition when consumer behavior is characterized
by conformity, the paper that is more closely related to ours is Grilo et al. (2001). However, while
the latter brings a static perspective on this issue, we shed light on the dynamic aspects of ﬁrms
interaction.
Our paper also adds to the literature on dynamic price competition in network industries.5
A number of recent works have studied the problem of dynamic competition in network indus-
tries (Doganoglu (2003), Mitchell and Skrzypacz (2006), Laussel et al. (2004), Markovich (2008),
Markovich and Moenius (2009), Doraszelski, Chen, and Harrington (2009) and Cabral (2007),
among others). While some models predict monotonic price trajectories (e.g. Doganoglu (2003)
and Laussel et al. (2004)), Cabral (2007) proposes a computational framework, in which prices do
not evolve linearly with market shares, a prediction which is in line with our results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic ingredients
of the model. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium in which both ﬁrms survive in every period
and provides conditions under which this equilibrium exists and it is unique. Section 4 analyzes
strategic interaction along the equilibrium path and, ﬁnally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a model in which two ﬁrms, indexed by 1 and 2, produce diﬀerentiated variants of a
good, whose lifetime is equal to one period. Variants are diﬀerentiated à la Hotelling and ﬁrms are
assumed to be located in the extrema of the Hotelling line [0,1]. Firms interact for three periods
choosing noncooperatively their prices.
The consumers (with mass equal to 1) are uniformly distributed in the Hotelling line. Every
period t, they buy one of the two existing variants. Notice that, in our setup, consumers are
considered to be atomistic and, therefore, there is no such thing as trendsetters.
5The literature on competition in network industries has ﬂourished after the seminal paper by Katz and Shapiro
(1985).
4Consumers’ utility when buying good i is
ui,t (x,pi,t,Di,t−1) = V − τ (x − xi)
2 + αDi,t−1 − pi,t. (1)
where (i) V represents the intrinsic value of consumers’ ideal variant of the good; (ii) τ > 0, the unit
travel cost; (iii) x ∈ [0,1], consumers’ location along the Hotelling line; and (iv) xi, the location of
ﬁrm i, with x1 = 0 and x2 = 1.6 The price of good i in period t is denoted by pi,t.
The utility function speciﬁed in (1) also takes into consideration the social value of goods
stemming from consumers’ desire for conformity. For the variant i, the social value is determined
by the installed base of users for this variant in the preceding period (Di,t−1). The intensity of the
conformity eﬀect is measured by the parameter α > 0.
To better understand the spirit of our model, consider the following example regarding the
choice of restaurants. Each period, consumers may opt for one of two restaurants: a sushi bar and
a pizzeria. Each consumer has a preference for the type of food oﬀered by each restaurant. In our
model, such preference is measured by V −τ (x − xi)
2 . However, when choosing which restaurant to
go to, consumers also take into consideration which is the restaurant à la mode, i.e., the restaurant
with a larger number of patrons in the preceding period.7 In our model, this corresponds to the
conformity eﬀect and it is measured by αDi,t−1. This type of conformity eﬀect is applicable to
fashion goods, capturing the idea that consumers’ choices do not depend on trends established in
a distant past. In the restaurant example, this amounts to saying that consumers’ perception of
which restaurant is à la mode in the last period does not depend on consumers’ choices in period
one.
According to (1), in period t, the consumer who is indiﬀerent between the two existing variants











where ∆Dt−1 = D1,t−1 − D2,t−1.
The demand for good 1 in period t as a function of the prices quoted by ﬁrms at t (resp. p1,t






with |p2,t − p1,t + α∆Dt−1| < τ to guarantee that both ﬁrms have strictly positive market shares.
The demand for good 1 in period t is simply D2,t = 1 − D1,t.
Evaluating (2) in period t−1, one obtains D1,t−1 (p1,t−1,p2,t−1,∆Dt−2). Replacing this expres-
sion in (2) it is possible to deﬁne market shares of period t conditional on the size of the installed
6We consider that V is suﬃciently large to guarantee that, at equilibrium, consumers always buy one of the goods.
Also, following d’ Aspremont et al. (1979), we consider quadratic travel costs.
7Obviously, depending on the interplay of intrinsic and social values, a consumer may opt diﬀerently in diﬀerent
periods.
5base of ﬁrms in period t − 2 and the prices quoted by ﬁrms at periods t and t − 1. Repeating
this exercise sequentially, we obtain the demand of ﬁrm i in period t conditional on ﬁrms’ initial
market shares (i.e. ∆D0 = D1,0 − D2,0) and the sequence of prices charged by ﬁrms from period 1



















Assuming that ﬁrms produce goods at a zero cost, the instantaneous proﬁts of ﬁrm i = 1,2 in
period t are equal to
πi,t (p1,t,p2,t,∆Dt−1) = Di,t(p1,t,p2,t,∆Dt−1)pi,t.
In our dynamic game, the players are the two ﬁrms and the strategies correspond to the three
dimensional vectors of prices Pi ∈ R3, with Pi = {pi,t}
3
t=1 and i = 1,2. In each period t, ﬁrms’
payoﬀs are given by the value of the discounted proﬁts accumulated from t to T = 3.
To characterize optimal price strategies in the context of this dynamic game, we rely on the
equilibrium notion of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE): at equilibrium, for each period,
each ﬁrm quotes the price p∗
i,t that maximizes the discounted proﬁts accumulated from t to T = 3
when ﬁrm i takes as given the price of the rival ﬁrm in period t (pj,t) as well as the diﬀerential on
the size of the past demands faced by ﬁrms in the preceding period
 
∆Di
t−1 = Di,t−1 − Dj,t−1
 
.
















,i = 1,2 (3)
where, for the sake of simplicity, we denote the vector (p1,t,p2,t,∆Dt−1) by ( ). Note that, for given
pj,t and ∆Dt−1, the price p∗
i,t (pj,t,∆Dt−1) that solves problem (3) takes into consideration the
impact of pi,t on contemporaneous proﬁts of ﬁrm i as well as the impact of this strategic decision
on the future proﬁts of this ﬁrm (dynamic eﬀect). This dynamic eﬀect arises because the choice of
pi,t has an eﬀect on the social value of the good oﬀered by ﬁrm i in period t+1. Accordingly, price
decisions in period t will inﬂuence the attractiveness of each variant for future consumers, aﬀecting
ﬁrms’ future proﬁts through the conformity eﬀect.
In the following section, we focus on the domain of parameters (α,τ) and initial conditions
(∆D0), for which the SPNE corresponds to interior solutions with both ﬁrms having strictly positive
market shares in every period.8 Under this restriction, we use backward induction techniques to
derive the explicit path of P = (P∗
1,P∗
2), corresponding to a SPNE of the multi-stage game.
8For example, there could be exit barriers, which are suﬃciently strong so that predatory strategies aiming to
evict the rival ﬁrm are unproﬁtable.
63 Equilibrium path
In this section, we derive the candidate SPNE in which both ﬁrms are active in every period
of interaction. Afterwards, we provide conditions under which the duopolistic candidate SPNE
corresponds to an eﬀective equilibrium.
We start by investigating strategic interaction in the last period. At t = 3, the vector of










with i = 1,2 and Di,3 (pi,3,pj,3,∆D2) obtained from (2) when t = 3.
For the domain of parameters (α,τ) and initial conditions (∆D0) that leads to duopolistic
equilibrium outcomes in period t = 3, the candidate equilibrium price strategies conditional on
∆D2 are given by the solution to the system of ﬁrst order conditions, namely:
p∗









In the light of (5) and (6), when both ﬁrms are active in the market, equilibrium market shares










2,3 (∆D2) = 1 − D∗
1,3 (∆D2).
Equilibrium proﬁts at T = 3 conditional on the diﬀerential ∆D2 are given by:
π∗
i,3 (∆D2) = D∗
i,3 (∆D2)p∗
i,3 (∆D2). (7)










πi,2 (pi,2,pj,2,∆D1) + π∗
i,3 (∆D2), i = 1,2, (8)
where, each ﬁrm i takes as given the price quoted by the rival at t = 2 as well as ∆D1.For the sake
of simplicity, the discount rate is assumed to be equal to 1.
The previous optimization problem can be re-written as follows:
max
pi,2
pi,2Di,2 (pi,2,pj,2,∆D1) + π∗
i,3 (pi,2,pj,2,∆D1), i = 1,2,
since ∆D2 is a function of (pi,2,pj,2,∆D1).The candidate price equilibrium can be obtained from
7the system of ﬁrst order conditions, yielding:
p∗




2  + 9τ2
4  + 9τ2∆D1, (9)
p∗




2  + 9τ2
4  + 9τ2∆D1, (10)









4  + 9τ2∆D1, (11)
D∗




2 (∆D1) = −
9ατ
4  + 9τ2∆D1.
Equilibrium instantaneous proﬁts are given by:
π∗
1,2 (∆D1) = p∗
1,2 (∆D1)D∗
1,2 (∆D1).
Introducing the equilibrium diﬀerential ∆D∗
2 (∆D1) in the expressions of equilibrium price
strategies at t = 3 conditional on ∆D2 (respectively given by (5) and (6)), we obtain:
p∗
1,3 (∆D1) = τ −
3α2τ
4  + 9τ2∆D1, (13)
p∗
2,3 (∆D1) = τ +
3α2τ
4  + 9τ2∆D1. (14)
To get a full description of equilibrium price paths, we move now to the analysis of ﬁrms’ price
decisions at t = 1. Considering that ﬁrms take as given the price quoted by the rival at t = 1 as
well as initial market shares (∆D0), the duopolistic candidate equilibrium at t = 1 corresponds to














i,t (pi,1,pj,1,∆D0), i = 1,2. (15)
The candidate equilibrium prices at t = 1 are given by:
p∗
1,1 (∆D0) = τ −
2α 




4  + 9τ2 2 + 2(3α)
2  





2,1 (∆D0) = τ −
2α 




4  + 9τ2 2 + 2(3α)
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Introducing (18) in (9); (10); (13) and (14), it is possible to describe the vector P∗
i, corresponding
to the path of prices that constitutes the candidate SPNE as a function of the initial market shares
and the parameters of the model:

    







= τ − 2α 


































0 = Di,0 − Dj,0, i,j = 1,2 and i  = j.
From (19) follows that the vector of equilibrium prices is non monotonic in ∆Di
0. For   α(τ) <
α < 3τ, the sign of
∂p∗
i,2(∆D0)
∂∆D0 is always positive, while the sign of
∂p∗
i,3(∆D0)




∂∆D0 depends on the parameters of the model, being negative for   α(τ) < α <     α(τ)

















At the candidate SPNE, market shares evolve according to the following trajectory:

    
    
D∗

























We proceed to investigate under which conditions the candidate equilibrium corresponds to an
eﬀective SPNE of the multi-stage game. These conditions are identiﬁed in Proposition 1 below:
Proposition 1 (Existence and uniqueness) When the intensity of the conformity eﬀect is such
that α ∈ (  α(τ),3τ), the vectors of prices P∗
i constitute a unique SPNE of the multi-stage game if
and only if the diﬀerential of ﬁrms’ initial installed base of customers is not too large:
   ∆Di
0




4  + 9τ2 2 + 3(2α)
2  
(4  + 9τ2)
. (21)
9The thresholds ￿ α(τ) and ￿ ￿ α(τ) are respectively the roots of the following polynomials:
￿





4  + 9τ
2￿2 + 2(3α)
2  .
9Proof. See the Appendix.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
4.1 Strategic substitutability and complementarity
Concentrating on the case of intermediate conformity eﬀects, α ∈ (  α(τ),3τ), and assuming that
the initial degree of asymmetry between the size of ﬁrms’ installed base of consumers is not too
large (condition (21) holds), we investigate the properties of P∗
i with respect to the strategic
complementarity and substitutability between ﬁrms’ contemporaneous price strategies. As already
mentioned in the Introduction, the actions of two or more players are called strategic complements
if they mutually reinforce one another, i.e. if the best reply of a ﬁrm to an increase in the action of
the rival is to increase its action. Likewise, they are called strategic substitutes if the reverse holds.
For the sake of exposition, within α ∈ (  α(τ),3τ), we distinguish a range of strong conformity
eﬀects,     α(τ) < α < 3τ, and a range of weak conformity eﬀects,   α(τ) < α <     α(τ). Diﬀerent results
are obtained for these two ranges of parameters.
Lemma 1 Strategic price complementarity and substitutability
In period 1, for weak conformity eﬀects, prices are strategic substitutes, whereas for strong confor-
mity eﬀects, prices are strategic complements. In period 2, prices are strategic substitutes while in
period 3, prices are strategic complements.
Proof. See the appendix.
In a context of price competition, it is well established in the literature that prices are often
strategic complements: a price-cutting strategy tends to induce price-cutting strategies by the rival
ﬁrms. However, according to the previous Lemma, along the equilibrium path, both price strategic
complementarity and price strategic substitutability arise. To clarify to which extent the existence
of conformity eﬀects may aﬀect the nature of price competition, we investigate the characteristics
of ﬁrms’ best reply functions in each period of interaction, starting with T = 3. In the last period,


















2, which yields strategic complementarity. This result is not
surprising since, in the last period of interaction, ﬁrms do not have any incentives to adopt strategies
seeking to increase the social value of their goods in subsequent periods. For a given ∆D2, an
increase in pj,3 leads to an increase in pi,3.
In period t = 2, the best reply functions are
10Figure 1: Strategic complementarity, t = 3.
Figure 2: Strategic substitutability, t = 2.
p1,2 (p2,2,∆D1) =
2  + 9τ2
2 







2  + 9τ2
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It is easy to observe that
∂pi,2
∂pj,2 < 0, resulting in price strategic substitutability that sharply contrasts
with the strategic complementarity result obtained for period t = 3.
The fact that prices are strategic substitutes in period t = 2 results from the dynamic ef-
fects created by conformity based behavior. If ﬁrms only considered the impact of pj,2 on in-
stantaneous proﬁts πi,2 (pi,2,pj,2,∆D1), we would get
∂2πi,2(pi,2,pj,2,∆D1)
∂pj,2∂pi,2 = 1
2τ > 0 (price strategic
complementarity). However, along the SPNE ﬁrms take into account the impact of their current
11decisions on future proﬁts. This dynamic eﬀect more than oﬀsets the direct (static eﬀect), yielding
strategic substitutability between pi,2 and pj,2. In period t = 2, ﬁrms have strong incentives to
invest in price-cutting strategies in order to induce favorable variations in ∆D2, which increase the
willingness to pay of consumers in the following period. In the light of these incentives, at t = 2,
competition is quite tough and both ﬁrms charge negative prices at equilibrium (see Figure 2).
Finally, in period t = 1, depending on the intensity of conformity eﬀects, prices can be either
strategic substitutes or strategic complements. The best reply functions are given by:
























∂pi,j < 0 when   α(τ) < α <     α(τ) and
∂pi,1
∂pi,j > 0 when     α(τ) < α < 3τ. In this period, prices are
not necessarily strategic complements because the static eﬀect coexists with dynamic eﬀects caused
by the intertemporal linkages of demands. However, notice that, in period t = 1, the dynamic eﬀect
is more complex than in period t = 2. The former can be decomposed in two distinct components:
(i) the eﬀect of (pi,1,pj,1) on π∗
i,2 via ∆D1; and (ii) the eﬀect of (pi,1,pj,1) on π∗
i,3 via ∆D∗
2 (∆D1).












∂pj,1∂pi,1 = −9 α4
τ(4 +9τ2)
2 < 0.
Again, the static eﬀect favors price strategic complementarity, while the dynamic eﬀects have
opposite signs. The full dynamic eﬀect is equal to 9α2 τ−1  
4  + 9τ2 −2 < 0, favoring strategic
substitutability. It is also worth noting that the sign of the total eﬀect (static and dynamic) depends
on the intensity of the conformity eﬀect.10 In the case of a weak conformity eﬀect, the negative
dynamic eﬀect dominates, inducing tougher price competition. In contrast, in the case of a strong
conformity eﬀect, the positive eﬀect dominates and prices are strategic complements.
4.2 Non-monotonic equilibrium trajectories and fashion shifts
In the context of a dynamic duopoly with conformity based behavior, we observe that the nature
of price strategic interaction changes substantially as time evolves. For this reason, along the
equilibrium path, ﬁrms’ prices (as well as the corresponding market shares) are non-monotonic.
Proposition 2 (Non monotonic price path)
Along the equilibrium price trajectory P∗
i, prices evolve non-monotonically: decreasing between pe-
riod t = 1 and t = 2 but increasing afterwards.




but it positively inﬂuences the





4  + 9τ
2￿−2￿
.
12Proof. See the appendix.
From Proposition 2, equilibrium price trajectories are not monotonic, corresponding instead to
a V-shaped trajectory:






Figure 3: Equilibrium price trajectories (τ = 1.5,α = 4.4,∆D0 = 0.05)












, is associated with the lack of dynamic incentives to
adopt price-cutting strategies in period t = 3. In period t = 2, diﬀerently from period t = 3,
ﬁrms enjoy dynamic beneﬁts from the enlargement of their base of users. For this reason, in period
t = 2, price competition tends to be very tough. This is not the case in period t = 3, in which the
user base expansion does not yield any dynamic beneﬁt, relaxing competition between ﬁrms and












is a priori less intuitive, since
one could think that the dynamic interplay of the conformity eﬀects could lead ﬁrms to quote lower
prices in period 1 (as it it is the case in a monopoly setting, see Gabszewicz and Garcia (2007,
2008)). However, in our setting, competition in period 2 is very intense and both ﬁrms charge
negative prices.11 Clearly, the larger are the ﬁrms’ market shares in period 2, the larger is the cost
of adopting demand enhancing strategies (since ﬁrms are charging a negative price on a larger base
of customers). As such, the ﬁerceness of competition in period 2 ends up creating a dynamic eﬀect
that dampens competition in period 1.12
In line with the equilibrium price paths, the equilibrium trajectories of market shares are not
monotonic and, in addition, there is a phenomenon of fashion shift in period t = 2.
11For the values of the parameters considered in this paper, α ∈ (￿ α(τ),3τ), it follows that accumulated proﬁts
from period t = 2 and t = 3 are positive for both ﬁrms, despite the proﬁt losses incurred in the second period.
12 Indeed, the ﬁrm enjoying the larger social value for its good in period 1 becomes, ceteris paribus, more attractive
in period 2. In a context of negative prices, this increases the cost of adopting demand-enhancing strategies in t = 2.
13Proposition 3 (Fashion shift)
When existence conditions are met, the ﬁrm beneﬁting from a larger initial base of customers (the
ﬁrm à la mode) loses this dominance after one period of interaction, becoming démodé.
Proof. See the appendix.
The phenomenon of fashion shift is caused by the ﬁerceness of competition in period 2. As
mentioned before, in period 2, both ﬁrms have strong incentives to invest in price cutting strategies
in order to boost the social values of their goods for the last period. In fact prices are actually
negative. Nevertheless, the magnitude of such incentives is not the same for both ﬁrms, with the
ﬁrm inheriting a smaller social value from the ﬁrst period (the former démodé ﬁrm ) having more
powerful incentives to invest in price cutting strategies.13 As a consequence, the price charged by
the previously unfashionable ﬁrm is substantially more negative than the price charged by its rival,
causing the phenomenon of fashion shift.
In the Figure 3, we depict the equilibrium trajectory of the ﬁrms’ market shares that exhibit
an oscillating behavior.






Figure 4: Equilibrium market shares path (τ = 1.5,α = 4.4,∆D0 = 0.05)





2, where i = 1,2 denotes the ﬁrm à la mode in the initial period.
(the reverse inequalities hold in the case of the démodé ﬁrm).
13Remind that the initally unfashionable ﬁrm has a lower initial base of consumers and therefore the cost of adopting
negative prices tends to be less signiﬁcant than the cost incurred by the ﬁrm à la mode.
145 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate dynamic price competition in a duopoly where consumers are con-
formist. We consider the conformity eﬀect to be delayed and non cumulative, in the sense that it
takes one period of time to observe the consumption trends and to follow them and that distant
past trends become irrelevant. To our knowledge, previous papers investigating dynamic price com-
petition in the presence of consumption externalities have been mostly focused on dynamic models
of inﬁnite time horizon, relying on equilibrium concepts of Markov Perfect Equilibrium, in certain
cases involving linear strategies. Also, most results are obtained through numeric simulation. Our
paper departs from this literature in two ways: ﬁrst, we consider a ﬁnite time horizon model and,
second, we privilege SPNE in detriment of the Markov Perfect Equilibrium. Under these two as-
sumptions, we show that equilibrium outcomes may substantially diﬀer from the predictions of the
existing models dealing with dynamic price competition in industries with positive externalities in
consumption.
We have characterize the properties of the SPNE in which both ﬁrms have positive market
shares, identifying a range of parameters in which such equilibrium exists and it is unique.
We conclude that ﬁrms change their pricing behavior as time evolves, with both price strategic
complementarity and price strategic substitutability arising along the equilibrium path. We observe
that, for the range of parameters in which the interior SPNE exists, the equilibrium path of prices
is V-shaped, with ﬁrms decreasing their prices in initial periods of interaction and increasing them
afterwards. In the intermediary period (corresponding to the valley of the V trajectory), com-
petition is quite tough, with both ﬁrms investing in price-cutting strategies that lead to negative
equilibrium prices.
With respect to the evolution of market shares, we observe that equilibrium paths are oscillating.
Also, we unveil a phenomenon of fashion shift, with the ﬁrm initially à la mode loosing its dominance
after one period of interaction. In the context of our model, this fashion shift phenomenon is
explained by the ﬁerceness of competition arising in the intermediary period.
Several questions naturally arise from our work. In our future research, we aim to investigate
the possibility of eviction outcomes, studying under which conditions ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to evict
the rival. We also aim to investigate how the length of the interaction period aﬀects our results.
To this end, we intend to develop a dynamic duopoly model with T periods. In the context of this
model, we intend to investigate whether the properties of fashion shift and V-shaped equilibrium
path prices still hold when the time horizon is extended.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
First, one must take into consideration that the candidate SPNE can only constitute an interior
SPNE in which both ﬁrms are active in the market, if the price strategies that compose P∗
i, i = 1,2,
15actually lead to duopolistic equilibrium outcomes. This amounts to say that the following conditions
must hold:
   p∗
2,t (∆D0) − p∗
1,t(∆D0) + α∆D∗
t−1 (∆D0)
    < τ, (22)
with t = 1,2,3. Substituting p∗
1,1 (∆D0) and p∗
2,1 (∆D0) in (22), we obtain, that in period t = 1 :
   ∆Di
0
    <
3τ
α(4  + 9τ2)
 
4  + 9τ2 2 + 3(2α)
2  
(4  + 9τ2)
.
Similarly, in period t = 2 :
   ∆Di
0




4  + 9τ2 2 + 3(2α)
2  
(4  + 9τ2)
(23)
and, ﬁnally, in period t = 3 :
   ∆Di
0




4  + 9τ2 2 + 3(2α)
2  
(4  + 9τ2)
.
For α ∈ (  α(τ),3τ), it follows that condition (23) is more restrictive than the other consistency
conditions and therefore this guarantees that P∗
i is consistent with an interior equilibrium in which
both ﬁrms have strictly positive market shares. Under the assumption that there are exit barriers
or signiﬁcant costs associated to no-production (i.e. we impose that both ﬁrms are active in the
market in every period), to demonstrate that the SPNE exists and is unique, it is suﬃcient to show







therefore the objective function is concave. In period t = 2, we have
∂2
 









which is negative for α < 3τ. Finally, in period t = 1, we obtain
∂2
 
πi,1 (◦) + π∗






4  + 9τ2 2 + (3α)
2  
τ (4  + 9τ2)
2 ,
which is negative when α >   α(τ).In the previous expression, for the sake of simplicity, the vector
(pi,1,pj,1,∆D0) is denoted by (◦). Accordingly, the objective functions are concave in every period
and, therefore, the equilibrium exists and it is unique.￿
Proof of Lemma 1









with Πi,t (pi,pj,∆Dt−1) standing for the objective function of ﬁrm i in period t and i,j = 1,2,









ﬁrms’ contemporaneous prices are said to be strategic substitutes. These derivatives can be directly
obtained from (4), (8) and (15).



















2  + 9τ2
τ3 ,
which is negative for any α such that   α(τ) < α < 3τ. Accordingly, in period t = 2, prices are








4  + 9τ2 2 + 2(3α)
2  
2τ (4  + 9τ2)
2 ,
which is negative when   α(τ) < α <     α(τ), and positive otherwise. Hence, when   α(τ) < α <     α(τ),
prices in period t = 1 are strategic substitutes. In contrast, when     α(τ) < α < 3τ), prices in period
t = 1 are strategic complements.￿
Proof of Proposition 2





















2α3 + 27τ3 − 18ατ2 − 4α2τ
  




The ﬁrst term is negative when α ∈ (  α,3τ). Likewise, the second term is positive, hence, the
17price diﬀerence is increasing in ∆Di
0. If it is negative for the highest possible ∆Di
0, it is negative








































27τ2 − 4α2 
(3τ − 2α)(α + 3τ)α2
(28α4 + 729τ4 − 324α2τ2)τ
∆Di
0
The diﬀerence is decreasing in ∆Di





















(2α − 3τ)(α + 3τ) > 0.￿
Proof of Proposition 3
The trajectory of market shares corresponding to the SPNE P∗
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implies that, the ﬁrm that accumulates a larger user base in
period t = 2 corresponds to the ﬁrm endowed with a narrower initial base of customers. Further-










< 0.Accordingly, in period t = 3,the initially
démodé ﬁrm has a larger market share than the ﬁrm that was initially à la mode.￿
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿￿# ￿ $ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿&￿ ￿&￿   ￿ ’ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿(   ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿* ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿   ￿,￿- ￿ ￿ ￿￿.   ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿ !
" # ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ $ % ￿&￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ 0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿
% ￿   ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 2 % 2 ￿￿ ￿   3 ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ( ￿) ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ 0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿4 ￿
,￿￿   ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! 2 ￿,￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿   ’ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 2 % 2 ￿￿ ￿   3 ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿, ￿* ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿- ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ 0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ 6 ￿   ￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿)   ￿   ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿/ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
3 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
+ ￿7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 0￿   ￿ ￿￿ ,￿￿   ￿ ￿￿￿   ￿ ’ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿   ￿" ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿. ￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿4 5 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿8 ￿
% ￿ ￿ ￿ 9 ￿   ￿￿! ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -   ￿) ￿￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿￿   ￿ ’ ￿￿￿￿" ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿" ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ 6 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿/ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿
7 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
5   ￿   / ￿ ￿￿ 2 ￿+   ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿2 ￿: ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: 2 ￿:   ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿, ￿) ￿￿￿
￿￿8 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿* ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿+ , ￿9 ￿￿￿" ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿
2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿* ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿; ￿￿￿ ￿1 ￿￿￿# ￿ ￿ ; ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
# ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 0￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 2 % 2 ￿￿ ￿   3 ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿- ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿, ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿ ￿ ; ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿,￿- ￿ ￿ ￿￿.   ￿ ￿￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿5   " ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿" # ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿￿
% ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿ ￿ ; ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ * ￿
￿ ￿ 0￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿   ￿ ’ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿:￿￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿1 ￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿< ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 1 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿! 2 ￿￿ 2 ￿( 2 ￿% ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿# ￿ $ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿&￿ ￿&￿   ￿ ’ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿,￿ ￿ ￿ ￿; ￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿+ ￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 4 ￿
,￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿+ 2 ￿,￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿( ￿￿   ￿ ￿￿! 2 ￿,2 ￿,2 ￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 2 ￿% 2 ￿% 2 ￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿= ￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿,￿￿   ￿￿￿ < ￿ 0/ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ / ￿   ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 2 % 2 ￿￿ ￿   3 ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿) ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ / ￿   ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 8 ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ 0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 9 ￿   ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿; ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿, ￿’ ￿￿￿
" ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿> ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ / ￿   ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
,￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿,￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ 0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!* ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ / ￿   ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿8 ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 2 % 2 ￿￿ ￿   3 ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ $ % ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿ ￿ < ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿8 ￿￿
# ￿ ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 2 % 2 ￿￿ ￿   3 ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ $ % ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ + ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿, ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿ ￿ < ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿8 ￿ ￿
# ￿ $ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿,￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿,2 ￿5 2 ￿,￿￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿+   ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿> ￿￿￿ ￿, ￿’ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿- ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿ ￿ < ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿8 * ￿
> ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. ￿ 0￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿   ￿ ’ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 2 % 2 ￿￿ ￿   3 ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿? @ A @ !
B C C D ￿￿￿,￿￿ ￿ < ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿8 1 ￿
,? ￿   ￿ ￿￿ 2 ￿￿ 2 ￿,2 ￿￿   ￿ ’ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿&￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿; ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿E ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
" < ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿E ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿" < ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿ ￿ < ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿8 4 ￿ ,￿￿   ￿￿ ￿￿) ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 2 % 2 ￿￿ ￿   3 ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿,￿￿ ￿ < ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿8 ￿￿
> ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. ￿ 0￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿   ￿ ’ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿? @ A A !
B C C D ￿￿￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ; ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿8 ￿ ￿
# ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿,2 ￿￿ 2 ￿: ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,￿￿   ￿￿+ 2 ￿￿ 2 ￿,￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ @ ￿￿   ￿ " < ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿   ￿￿ 2 ￿5 2 ￿￿ 2 ￿￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿; ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ; ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿8 8 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿" < ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿; ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ; ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿8 ￿ ￿ # ￿ $ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿&￿ ￿&￿   ￿ ’ ￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ; ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿+   ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿ ￿￿￿&￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿* ￿￿￿￿+ ￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿9 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ; ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿,? ￿   ￿ ￿+ ￿   ￿￿   ￿ ’ ￿￿￿￿" ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿, ￿* ￿￿￿￿+ ￿
F ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ; ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ A ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ 0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ = ￿# ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿￿￿7 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿= ￿￿￿￿G ￿9 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿7 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ + ￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ; ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ * ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿,￿￿   ￿￿5   " ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 6 ￿   ￿￿5   " ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ? ￿   ￿￿￿   0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿,￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿  ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ 3 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿- ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ 0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 1 ￿
,￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 2 ￿( 2 ￿￿ " ￿   ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿! 2 ￿￿ 2 ￿( 2 ￿% ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ 0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 4 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ $ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿&￿ ￿&￿   ￿ ’ ￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
7 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿= ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ 0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
,  " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿9 + ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ 0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 0￿   ￿ ￿￿￿% ￿   ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿,? ￿   ￿ ￿+ ￿   ￿￿   ￿ ’ ￿￿￿￿7 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
" ￿￿￿￿￿+ , ￿’ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
H = ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’ ￿ 0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 8 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 0￿   ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 9 ￿   ￿ ￿5   " ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿,? ￿   ￿ ￿+ ￿   ￿￿   ￿ ’ ￿￿￿￿= ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
* ￿￿￿￿+ , ￿7 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ + ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿= ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’ ￿ 0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿B ￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿￿ ￿! ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿- ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
* ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿> ￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 2 % 2 ￿￿ ￿   3 ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿’ ￿ ; ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿9 ￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ % ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿> ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿* ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿   ￿,2 ￿.   ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿&￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿F ￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
9 ￿￿￿- ￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿1 ￿
,￿￿   ￿￿,￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿   ￿ < ￿ ￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿2 " ￿ % ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿4 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ 0￿ ￿￿ ￿￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿:   ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿￿2 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿4 . ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿8 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿= ￿￿I ￿￿￿￿, ￿) ￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" # ￿￿￿6 ￿ ￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
% ￿   ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 0￿   ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 2 % 2 ￿￿ ￿   3 ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿ ￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ 0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 0￿   ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 2 % 2 ￿￿ ￿   3 ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿￿2 ￿￿￿￿￿- ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿J￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿* ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ $ % ￿￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ 0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿8 ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 9 ￿   ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 9 ￿   ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ 7 ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿= % ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
7 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿; ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿; ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ 0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
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￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿